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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020137-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from four convictions for attempted communications fraud, third 
degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-102(3) & 76-10-1801 (1999). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue 1: Do subsections 76-10-1801(2) & (5) of the communications fraud statute 
permit each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as a 
separate criminal offense, the degree of which is determined by the total value of all property 
or monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme to defraud? 
Interpretation of statutory provisions, including their constitutionality, is a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, <f 5. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Issue 2: Do the variations of racketeering in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603(1) & (2) 
(1999), require proof that the proceeds derived from a pattern of illegal activity were invested 
to further the criminal scheme or used by someone other than defendant? 
See standard of review applicable to statutory interpretation, Issue 1, supra. Whether 
a criminal charge is subject to pretrial dismissal is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8,20 P.3d 300 (applying correctness standard to 
a denial of a motion to quash a criminal information). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A and include: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602 (1999) - Definitions - Racketeering Enterprises 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1999) - Unlawful Acts - Racketeering Enterprises 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999) - Communications Fraud 
United States Constitution, Amendment V - Double Jeopardy 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 2,2000, defendant was charged with second degree felony racketeering 
and eleven counts of second degree felony communications fraud (R. 1-11). Defendant 
waived preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial (R. 74). Based upon the parties' 
stipulation as to what the preliminary hearing testimony would have been if witnesses had 4 
been called, defendant subsequently moved to reduce the degree or number of the 
communications fraud charges and to quash the racketeering charge (R. 76-84,85-94). See 
< 
I 
2 
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Addendum B (Stipulation). The trial court denied the motion (R. 117; R.156: 3-9).l See 
Addendum C(Ruling). Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas 
to four reduced charges of attempted communications fraud, third degree felonies, reserving 
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce and/or quash the charges (R. 119-20, 
128; R.157: 2-9). The remaining eight felony charges were dismissed (R. 119,128; R.157: 
3,7). 
On January 15, 2002, defendant was sentenced to four concurrent terms of zero-to-
five years imprisonment and ordered to make full restitution (R. 140-42; R. 158: 13). On 
February 12, 2002, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 143). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of defendant's motion to reduce and/or quash the charges, the parties 
stipulated to the testimony which the State would have presented if defendant had not waived 
preliminary hearing (R. 76-84) (Addendum B). 
In sum, the stipulation establishes that in 1998, defendant's real estate appraiser's 
license was revoked based on his "pattern of inflating property values for the purpose of 
defrauding by means of false or fraudulent pretenses" (R. 83). 
Beginning in January 2000 and continuing through June 2000, defendant falsely 
represented himself to be a co-owner or to have a financial interest in existing mortgage 
1
 The record does not contain written findings and conclusions, however, the 
parties stipulated to the facts and the court entered a complete oral ruling (R. 76-84; 
R.156: 3-9). See Addenda B & C 
3 
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companies, including Classic Mortgage and In-Time Funding (R. 1-11, 76-82). The owners 
of the companies knew defendant, but he was not associated with or employed by the 
mortgage companies (R. 83). 
Using the false representations of his business status, defendant approached some 
fourteen victims who were facing foreclosure or otherwise needed to refinance their homes 
(R. 76-82; R.158: 12).2 In each case, defendant falsely represented that he could obtain 
refinancing for the homeowners) if the homeowners) would pay defendant a fee ranging 
from $400 to $500 for a title search, credit check and other necessary documentation (R. 76-
82). The victims paid defendant the requested fee, but no documentation was ever prepared 
and no refinancing was sought or obtained (id.). 
Brett Kennedy and William Thomas worked with defendant and witnessed 
defendant's misrepresentations to some of the victims (R. 82). Additionally, defendant 
solicited Thomas to "falsely represent himself as an appraiser" to one of the victims (id.). 
When defendant was confronted by a criminal investigator from the Attorney 
General's Office, defendant admitted he had defrauded the victims (R. 83-84). He also 
admitted that he used the illegal proceeds to "pay his personal bills" (R. 84). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Communications Fraud: One subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute 
plainly permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be 
2
 Some victims were married couples and combined in a count, resulting in eleven 
counts of communications fraud, but fourteen named victims (R. 1-11). 
4 
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charged as a separate offense. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(5) (Addendum A). Another 
subsection of the same statute plainly directs that the total value of the monies obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme be combined to determine the degree of any offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(2). Defendant admits the two subsections are clear, but 
claims that whether they should be applied together is ambiguous. According to defendant, 
he constitutionally may be charged with eleven counts of class A misdemeanor 
communications fraud, based on the value of the individual sums he obtained from each 
victim, or one count of second degree felony communications fraud, based on the aggregated 
value of the total monies received from all victims, but he may not be charged with eleven 
counts of second degree felony fraud. 
Defendant is wrong. Established rules of statutory construction require two 
subsections of the same statute to be read together and for a statute to be read as a whole so 
that no portion of the statute is rendered superfluous or inoperative. When read as a whole, 
section 76-10-1801 is not ambiguous: subsection (2) governs the degree of any offense 
charged, while subsection (5) governs the number of offenses which may be charged. Nor 
is section 76-10-1801 unconstitutional: subsections (2) & (5) simply reflect a legislative 
prerogative to consider not only the injury caused by a fraudulent scheme, but also the nature 
and breadth of the scheme in determining culpability. 
Because section 76-10-1801 is both plain and constitutional, the trial court properly 
denied defendant's motion to reduce the degree or number of the charged counts of 
communications fraud. 
5 
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Racketeering: Utah's racketeering statute prohibits "any person/' who as a principal 
receives proceeds from a pattern of illegal activity, from directly or indirectly using the 
illegal proceeds in the operation or control of an "enterprise." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1603(1) & (2) {Addendum A). Statutorily, an individual may be an enterprise and, under 
section 76-10-1603( 1) & (2), that individual may be the principal who receives the funds may 
be the same. Here, defendant, who falsely held himself out to be legitimately associated with 
existing mortgage companies, was both the principal who received the funds and the named 
enterprise. 
Based on the posture of this case, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
to quash the racketeering charge. Defendant waived preliminary hearing and then, for 
purposes of his motion, proceeded on limited stipulated facts. Those facts established that 
defendant, by misrepresenting his business status and associations, obtained over $5000 
through a pattern of illegal activity and used the illegal proceeds to pay "personal bills." As 
the trial court correctly ruled, sections 76-10-1603(1) & (2) do not require proof that the 
illegal proceeds were used to further the criminal scheme or that the funds were used by 
some entity other than defendant. While more evidence might be required for conviction, 
alleging that defendant, as the principal and the enterprise, used the illegal funds to pay bills 
was sufficient to avoid pretrial dismissal. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH'S COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
STATUTE PERMITS EACH COMMUNICATION TO BE CHARGED 
AS A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS 
DETERMINED BY THE TOTAL MONIES OBTAINED OR SOUGHT 
TO BE OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 
Defendant concedes that one subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute 
permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as a 
separate criminal offense (R. 85-86 & Brief of Appellant [BrAplt] at 12). See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-1801(5) (1999) (Addendum A). Defendant also concedes that another 
subsection of the same statute directs that the degree of the offense is determined by the total 
monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme (R.155: 5-6 & BrAplt at 12). See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(2) (Addendum A). Nevertheless, defendant claims that 
nothing in section 76-10-1801 directs that its two subsections be read together and that the 
statute is, therefore, ambiguous (BrAplt at 10-12). According to defendant, the prosecutor 
must elect between charging him with eleven counts of class A misdemeanor 
communications fraud based on his having fraudulently obtained $400-5500 from eleven 
victims, or charging him with one second degree felony based on his having obtained in 
excess of $5000 in his overall fraudulent scheme (BrAplt at 8, 12 & 16). Defendant's 
interpretation conflicts with established rules of statutory construction. 
It is well-recognized that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, [a court's] primary goal is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, U 8 
7 
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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, 
110,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The best evidence of a statute's meaning is its plain language, 
which the court must assume was selected "advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8. "'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must 
be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Hardy, 2002 UT 
App 244, f 10 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P. 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). 
Moreover, courts must look to all provisions of a statute to "'avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Martinez at f 8 and Hardy at f10 
. (both quoting Hall v. Utah DepL of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 15,24 P.3d 958). 
Subsection (1) of section 76-10-1801 states: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
[communications fraud]. 
Subsection (2) directs: 
The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) A 
except [when the object of the scheme is other than the "obtaining of 
something of monetary value"]. 
Here, it is undisputed that defendant devised a scheme to obtain monies in excess of $5000, 
i 
which constitutes a second degree felony {BrAplt. at 12). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1801(l)(d) (classifying as a second degree felony, a scheme in which more than $5000 is 
8 
i 
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obtained) (Addendum A). Defendant claims, however, that no matter how many victims 
were involved or communications made, subsection (2) only permits one aggregated felony 
to be charged (Br.Aplt. at 8,12 & 16). Defendant's interpretation of subsection (2) ignores 
subsection (5).3 
Subsection (5) of section 76-10-1801 provides: 
Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing 
a scheme or artifice describe in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
Again, defendant admits that if read alone, subsection (5) permits him to be charged with 
eleven separate criminal offenses - a separate offense based on each communication and/or 
victim (Br.Aplt. at 11-12 & 16). But defendant asserts that if multiple charges are filed, the 
charges must be only class A misdemeanors based on the value of the money obtained from 
an individual victim (Br.Aplt. at 77-72). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(b) 
(classifying as class A misdemeanors schemes in which more than $300 but less than $1000 
is obtained) (Addendum A). Specifically, defendant argues that the multiple charges 
permissible under subsection (5) cannot be aggregated under subsection (2) to eleven felonies 
because section 76-10-1801 contains no express language directing that the subsections be 
3
 Below, defendant also argued that because section 76-10-1801(1) spoke in terms 
of a "scheme or artifice to defraud another" subsection (2) only permitted aggregation if 
one victim was defrauded multiple times, not multiple victims defrauded once (R. 87-88). 
The trial court rejected the argument because singular statutory terms necessarily include 
the plural (R. 98; R.156: 3). See State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 407, 409 n.3 (Utah 1963) 
(citing what is currently designated as UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12(l)(a) (Supp. 2002)). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge this portion of the trial court's ruling. 
9 
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read together (Br.Aplt. at 12). According to defendant, without such language, the 
communications fraud statute is ambiguous and he is, therefore, entitled to the most lenient 
interpretation of its penalties (Br.Aplt. 11-16). 
(A) Defendant Is Not Entitled To Lenity Because No Ambiguity Exists. 
Relying on his argument that the interplay of subsections (2) & (5) of section 76-10-
1801 is ambiguous, defendant asserts that the "rule of lenity requires this Court to construe 
the statute in [his] favor" (Br.Aplt. at 11). Utah appellate courts have not formally 
recognized the "rule of lenity" as a rule of statutory construction. Instead, after interpreting 
a statute, Utah courts have applied the "rule of lenity" to accord a defendant the lesser of two 
applicable penalties. See State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, f 8, 14 P.3d 129 (quoting 
Statev. Yates, 918 P.2d 136,138(UtahApp. 1996), and applying the rule to give a defendant 
the "benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by an amended statute made effective prior to 
sentencing"); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah App. 1997) (same). 
Some jurisdictions recognize lenity as a formal rule of construction: "when the 
Legislature fails to indicate the allowable unit of prosecution and sentence with clarity, doubt 
as to the legislative intent should be resolved in favor of lenity for the accused." State v. 
Green, 534 S.E.2d 395, 403 n. 13 (W.Va. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). But even when recognized as a guide to statutory construction, the rule "only 
serves as an aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule comes 
into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the 
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers." United States v. 
10 
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Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 n.10 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It 
is unclear if Utah has adopted this application of the rule, although it clearly has recognized 
the concept of lenity. See State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694,696 (Utah 1981) (without using the 
term "rule of lenity," citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955), for the 
"presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the 
imposition of a harsher punishment"); State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969) 
(without using the term "rule of lenity," recognizing "that where there is doubt or uncertainty 
as to which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser"). 
In any case, all courts agree that a defendant is not entitled to lenity unless a statute 
is ambiguous. See Turkette, id. (concluding that rule of lenity was inapplicable because no 
statutory ambiguity existed); Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, f 10 ("where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to 
divine legislative intent") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Green, 534 S.E.2d 
at 403 n. 13 ("[b]ecause we find the statutory text to be unambiguous... we do not consider 
the rule of lenity"). Accord Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 10 ("[w]hen language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, no ambiguity exists.4 
4
 Defendant claims that the prosecutor conceded that the statute was ambiguous 
(Br.Aplt. at 12). She did not. She consistently argued that the statute was clear, but 
forthrightly informed the court that "we've had [district] courts go both ways" on the 
issue (R. 98-107; R.155: 9). This is, however, the first case to raise the issue on appeal. 
11 
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Defendant's argument that section 76-10-1801 is ambiguous is premised on a 
fundamental fallacy, that is, that express language is necessary to combine application of two 
subsections of the same statute. To the contrary, subsections of the same statute - and even 
different statutes governing the same subject - are necessarily read together under established 
rules of statutory construction. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 11. Additionally, a statue must be 
read to give harmonious meaning to each of its provisions, without overlooking any terms. 
Id. at f t 8 & 11. See also cases cited, supra at 7-8. 
Read together, subsection (5) plainly governs the number of offenses permitted to be 
charged, while subsection (2) plainly governs the degree of each of those offenses. See 
discussion, supra at 8-9. Consequently, lenity does not apply. 
Moreover, because it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and 
punishments, this Court may not "comment on the legislature's wisdom" in enacting criminal 
statutes. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 15. Nor is a penalty susceptible to challenge merely 
because it is more severe for some variations of a crime than others. Cf. State v. Mace, 921 
P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that an appellate court "may not require the 
legislature to select the least severe penalty possible"). Indeed, the legislature may impose 
harsher penalties on certain crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so. State v. 
Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a 
state to impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which 
is imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related 
or of which it is a subcategory"). See, e.g.9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(e) (making 
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communications fraud a second degree felony whenever the object sought to be obtained by 
the scheme is "other than the obtaining of something of monetary value"); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-412( 1 )(a)(iv) & (b)(iii) (1999) (making theft of any item from "the person of another" 
a second degree felony and theft of a chicken or any livestock a third degree felony) 
(Addendum A). 
Defendant complains that multiple aggregated felonies are not allowed in other 
jurisdictions (BrAplt. at 13-16 & 21). Defendant also contends that allowing multiple 
aggregations is inconsistent with Utah's charging schemes in theft and forgery cases (BrAplt. 
at 20-23)} While Utah's communications fraud statute is somewhat unique, its approach is 
not fatally inconsistent with other Utah provisions or non-Utah jurisdictions. More 
significantly, nothing requires a statute to be consistent with the penalties applicable to a 
different crime. 
Defendant asserts that federal fraud provisions do not permit aggregation (BrAplt 
at 15). This is correct, but defendant fails to state why. Federal fraud counts do not need to 
be aggregated because all mail, wire, and communication frauds are felonies regardless of 
the amount of money obtained. See 18 U.S.C.§§ 1341 & 1343 (making frauds committed 
5
 Additionally, defendant asserts that permitting multiple felony counts would be 
inconsistent with precedent from this Court, to wit, State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah 
App. 1997) (BrAplt at 21). This is incorrect. Ross did not address the permissibility of 
multiple felony charges because Ross was only charged with one aggregated felony. Id. 
at 238. By comparison, in State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah App. 1990), Tebbs 
was charged with multiple felony communications frauds, but it is unclear whether any 
were based on aggregated value. As noted previously, supra at 11 n.4, no Utah appellate 
court has addressed the issue. 
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by use of the mail, wire, radio, or television punishable by up to a million-dollar fine and 30-
years imprisonment). At the same time, under federal law, each communication made in 
furtherance of a fraud may be charged as a separate crime. Badders v. United States. 240 
U.S. 391, 394 (1916); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Consequently, if this were a federal offense, defendant could be charged with eleven felony 
fraud counts, just as he is under state law.6 
It is also true that some jurisdictions only permit aggregation in the alternative, that 
is, charging multiple lesser frauds based on individual values or one greater fraud based on 
an aggregated value. But those jurisdictions are governed by the specific wording of their 
statutes. See, e.g.9 FLA. STATUTES § 817.034(3) & (4) (2000) (permitting aggregation to 
determine the degree of the crime of "organized fraud"(racketeering), while not providing 
for aggregation in communications frauds, but designating all communications frauds over 
$300 as felonies, and permitting separate judgments and sentences to be imposed for 
racketeering and for each communication made as long as both involved the same scheme)7; 
State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998, 999-1000 (Me. 1992) (interpreting Maine statute which 
6
 In the same argument, defendant discusses section 76-10-180 Ts legislative 
history and intent {BrAplt. at 14-15). That discussion is irrelevant because the language 
of the statute is plain. See Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8; Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 10. 
In any case, the minimal legislative history supports that the Utah legislature 
contemplated a statute comparable to the federal. See Br.Aplt, Addenda I&J. Under 
either statutory scheme, defendant's actions support eleven counts of felony fraud. 
7
 Under Florida law, defendant could be charged with eleven counts of third degree 
felony communications fraud and one count of racketeering. 
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states that multiple thefts may be "aggregated to charge a single theft of appropriate class or 
grade" to mean thefts involving the same victim could be aggregated into a single theft 
count) (emphasis added); Goodwin v. State, 738 S.W.2d 1,5 (Texas App. 1987) (interpreting 
Texas statute which states that thefts involving one scheme but different victims may be 
"considered as one offense and the amounts aggregated in determining the grade of the 
offense" to mean that multiple theft convictions merged for purposes of sentencing) 
(emphasis added). Or, the decisions do not involve fraud, but theft, which has a different 
analytical underpinning. Accord Patience, 944 P.2d at 391 (recognizing that theft focuses 
on the "end" accomplished (the value taken) and is, therefore, governed by the "single 
larceny rule," which requires multiple thefts to be consolidated as one; but the larceny rule 
has no application to other crimes, such as forgery, which focus on the "means" by which the 
crime is committed). Compare, e.g., State v. Joles, 492 So.2d 490,493-494 (La. 1986), cert 
denied, 479 U.S.I 056 (1987) (interpreting theft statute as permitting multiple thefts from the 
same victim to be aggregated into one charge or charged as multiple lesser offense).8 
The language of Louisiana's theft statute is similar, though not identical, to 
Utah's communications fraud provision. Compare Joles, 492 So.2d at 491, with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Addendum A). But as noted, theft is traditionally governed by 
the "single larceny doctrine." Patience, 944 P.2d at 391; Barker, 624 P.2d at 695. Other 
crimes - especially those involving distinct acts with distinct victims - are not. Id. 
Therefore, Joles' interpretation of its theft statute has little application here. 
Moreover, the legislature may permissibly view a number of small crimes as 
seriously as a larger crime and devise a punishment scheme accordingly. Joles, 492 
So.2d at 494. Defendant accepts this premise, but extrapolates that he is being 
impermissibly treated as severely as someone who stole $5000 from 11 different people 
(Br.Aplt. at 13-14); Defendant is correct that he faces the same charges as a person who 
obtains more money from the same number of victims, but fails to acknowledge why. (n.8 
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Moreover, while some state jurisdictions permit, but do not mandate, the aggregation 
of individual frauds into a single count, they also designate all communications fraud, 
regardless of value, as felonies. See, e.g., ARIZ. STATUTES §§ 13-2310(D) & 13-1801(B) 
(2001) (designating any communications fraud, regardless of value, as a class 2 felony, but 
permitting multiple fraud, "whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons," 
to be aggregated into a single count, in the discretion of the prosecutor, so that if $100,000 
or more is obtained, sentence may not be suspended and probation may not be imposed).9 
Consequently, comparison to other jurisdictions provides little guidance here. 
Likewise, defendant's comparisons to Utah's theft and forgery provisions are of no 
avail (Br.Aplt. at 22-23). Theft and forgery are distinct crimes, ruled by specific statutes 
which do not include section 76-10-1801 fs language-l0 Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
cont.) Utah's fraud statue punishes equally all schemes in which $5000 or more is 
obtained. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(d) (setting $5000 as threshold amount 
for second degree felony and not providing for any higher level of punishment) 
(Addendum A). Thus, the person who defrauds 11 people of $5000 each faces the same 
magnitude of charges as the person who defrauds 11 people of one million dollars each. 
Similarity of treatment is not prohibited; indeed, the federal and some state schemes treat 
all frauds as felonies regardless of the value obtained. See discussion, supra at 13-14 and 
infra at n.9. 
9
 Because aggregation is discretionary under Arizona law, defendant could also be 
charged with eleven counts of felony communications fraud in Arizona. 
10
 Below, defendant claimed that communications fraud and theft by deception 
were similar crimes and, pursuant to Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48, he was entitled to the 
more lenient punishment (R. 90-91). The trial court rejected this argument because 
communications fraud and theft by deception are not identical crimes (R.156: 4). See 
State v. Fedorowcz, 2002 UT 67, f 47,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 
66, f 33, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. On appeal, defendant does not challenge this part of the 
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412 and 76-6-501 (1999), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Addendum A). In contrast, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(2) & (4) (1999) (Addendum A\ governing insurance fraud, 
specifically adopts the communications fraud charging scheme. While this portion of the 
insurance fraud statute has not been judicially interpreted, section 76-6-52 Ts specific 
reference to section 76-10-1801 evidences the legislature's understanding that the charging 
scheme permissible for communications fraud is something different and distinct from that 
found in Utah's general theft or forgery provisions. 
In sum, section 76-10-1801 reflects the legislature's prerogative to consider not only 
the injury caused by a fraudulent scheme, but also the nature and breadth of the scheme in 
determining culpability. Cf. State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145,148 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing 
legitimacy of legislature providing greater punishment for computer fraud simply because 
computer crimes are "difficult to police and have a greater potential for ruinous 
consequences"). 
(B) Section 76-10-1801 Clearly Establishes The Unit of Prosecution. 
Of course, the legislative prerogative to define crimes and punishments must be 
exercised within constitutional parameters. In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, a 
court is obligated to presume the statute valid and "resolve any reasonable doubts in favor 
of constitutionality.'9 Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 6 (citation and internal quotation marks 
(n.10 cont.) ruling. Instead, his complaint appears to be more general, i.e., that multiple 
aggregated counts of communications fraud should not be permitted because theft and 
forgery may not be charged in this fashion. 
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omitted). Moreover, a "'statute should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and 
unmistakable violation of some provision of the constitution."1 Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 778 
(quoting Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d 669, 670-71 (Utah 1971)). 
Here, defendant argues subsections (2) and (5) cannot both apply because such a result 
would punish him twice for the same offense and, thereby, violate the federal prohibition 
against double jeopardy (BrAplt. at 16-19). More specifically, defendant contends that 
section 76-10-1801 does not clearly define the allowable "unit of prosecution" and, therefore, 
the statue is ambiguous and defendant entitled to lenity (BrAplt. at 17-18). Defendant also 
contends that the charges are multiplicitious, that is, he is being charged multiple times for 
the same act (BrAplt. at 23-24). Because section 76-10-1801 plainly defines the allowable 
"unit of prosecution" and that unit permits multiple felonies to be charged, defendant's 
constitutional arguments fail.11 
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution prohibits multiple punishments for 
the same offense.12 State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1230 (Utah 1998), This variation of 
11
 For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that permitting multiple charges 
based on the aggregate value of a scheme also violates the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (BrAplt. at 16-20). Because defendant 
did not raise this issue below (R. 85-94; R.155: 5-7), it is waived on appeal and the State 
does not address it See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 15. 
12
 Defendant's argument is predicated on the Fifth Amendment, with only nominal 
reference to the comparable state constitutional provision (R. 89 & BrAplt at 16-18). 
Separate state constitutional analysis, therefore, is waived. See State v. Pixel, 1999 UT 
App 270, f 4 n. 1, 987 P.2d 1288. In any case, state and federal double jeopardy 
provisions are co-extensive. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). 
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double jeopardy, commonly referred to as "multiplicity," "prohibits the Government from 
charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments 
for the same act." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f 24, 31 P.3d 547 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Whether charges are multiplicitious is resolved by determining 
the allowable "unit of prosecution" intended by the legislature for a given crime. Bell, 349 
U.S. at 82. This, in turn, is resolved by the plain language of the statute. State v. Adel, 965 
P.2d 1072,1074 (Wash. 1998) (recognizing that while determination of the designated unit 
of prosecution is of "constitutional magnitude," it is ultimately resolved by statutory 
interpretation and legislative intent). Indeed, 
[t]he protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause place few, if any, 
limitations on a legislative body's power to delineate criminal offenses and fix 
their punishments. . . . rather, the prohibition merely acts to ensure that 
sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the 
limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government, in which lies the 
substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments.... A claim 
that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments imposed 
after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to 
punishment. . . . In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause takes the 
substantive criminal law as it finds it. 
Green, 534 S.E.2d at 400. 
Here, the legislature clearly defined the allowable "unit of prosecution." As stated, 
section 76-10-1801(5) directs that every communication made in furtherance of the scheme 
is a separate offense. Section 76-10-1801(2) specifies that the degree of an offense is 
determined by the total value of the scheme. Defendant is not, as he claims, being punished 
for the same act eleven times (R. 89-90 & Br.Aplt at 17-18). Each criminal act, each 
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communication to a different victim, is punished only once, but the degree of punishment for 
that individual act is determined by the overall value of the scheme. See discussion, supra 
at 8-12. From a penalogical perspective, the result is no different than designating all 
communications frauds, regardless of value, as felonies and then prosecuting each 
communication made in furtherance of the fraud as a separate offense - a statutory scheme 
followed federally and by some jurisdictions. Defendant implicitly admits this scheme is 
permissible. 
In sum, the plain language of section 76-10-1801 permits the number of offenses to 
be determined by the number of communications made and the degree of any offense to be 
determined by the overall value of the scheme. This allowed defendant to be charged with 
eleven counts of second degree felony communications fraud. The trial court, therefore, 
properly denied defendant's motion to reduce the number or degree of the fraud charges 
(R.156: 3-4) (Addendum Q. 
POINT II 
THE FIRST TWO SUBSECTIONS OF UTAH'S RACKETEERING 
STATUTE DO NOT REQUIRE PROOF THAT PROCEEDS DERIVED 
FROM A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY WERE USED TO 
FURTHER THE CRIMINAL SCHEME OR USED BY SOMEONE 
OTHER THAN THE DEFENDANT 
Like many states, Utah has a racketeering statute patterned somewhat on the federal 
RICO scheme. See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 101 n.l (Utah 1988). Utah's scheme, like 
the federal, recognizes four general theories of prohibited activities: (1) the use or investment 
of income derived from a pattern of illegal activity in the acquisition or maintenance or 
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operation of a statutorily-defmed enterprise; (2) the acquisition or maintenance of any 
interest in or control of a statutorily-defmed enterprise; (3) the employment by or association 
with an enterprise whose affairs are conducted through a pattern of unlawful activity; or (4) 
a conspiracy to violate any of the prior three provisions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 
(1999) {Addendum A). Only the first two theories are at issue in this case (R. 1-11,109-11). 
Section 76-10-1603 reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has receive any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the 
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, 
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment of use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest, 
or the establishment or operation of any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(Addendum A). For purposes of both subsections, a "person" is defined as "any individual 
or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-10-1602(3) (1999) (Addendum A). An "enterprise" is defined as "any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes 
illicit as well as licit entities." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(1). 
Despite these statutory definitions, defendant moved to quash the racketeering charge 
because he claimed that an individual cannot "invest" in himself or another human being 
without violating the anti-slavery laws and, therefore, defendant's use of the illegal proceeds 
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to pay bills was insufficient to establish a violation of sections 76-10-1603(1) or (2) (R. 93) 
(Addendum D). Defendant also argued that the illegal proceeds must be "invested somehow 
towards furthering the [racketeering] scheme" (R.156: 7). At the same time, defendant 
admitted that if he used the funds to "print out business cards" that would "arguably" satisfy 
the racketeering requirements (id). As will be discussed more fully, the trial court properly 
denied the motion to quash (R. 156: 3-9) (Addendum Q. 
(A) Defendant Is Not Entitled To Raise Unpreserved Arguments. 
On appeal, defendant impermissibly expands his argument beyond that preserved by 
his conditional plea bargain. See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, | 13 (recognizing that a 
unconditional guilty plea waives all "nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations"); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 1 l(i) (permitting the parties to enter into an 
agreement conditioning a guilty plea on the right to appeal "the adverse ruling of any 
specified pre-trial motion"). For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that sections 76-
10-1603( 1) & (2) require him to be a business entity or associated with other businesses and 
requires proof that his illegal efforts required organization or assistance from others (Br.Aplt. 
at 25-33). Defendant admits that the stipulated facts establish that he worked with two other 
people when he made his misrepresentations to some victims, but asserts, for the first time, 
that the stipulated facts do not adequately establish what this involvement was (Br.Aplt. at 
29-32). Defendant also claims for the first time on appeal that racketeering requires proof 
of a specific injury to the enterprise (Br.Aplt. at 33-34). These arguments were not raised 
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below and are, therefore, waived.13 See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, % 13. 
(B) The Trial Court Properly Rejected Defendant's Limited Challenge. 
To the extent defendant's argument below is preserved for appeal, his challenge is 
limited by the procedural posture of his motion to quash. Defendant waived preliminary 
hearing (R. 74; R.156: 6). The parties then stipulated to what the preliminary hearing 
13
 Even if defendant's appellate arguments were preserved and entitled to 
consideration, the arguments are not properly supported. Here, the prosecutor abandoned 
reliance on the third variation of the racketeering statute, section 76-10-1603(3), which 
requires proof that the "person" was employed by or associated in fact with an enterprise 
and conducted the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering (R. 1-11, 
111). See Addendum A. Nevertheless, defendant cites as authority decisions interpreting 
the third variation {BrAplt at 28-33). Those decisions provide no support for 
interpreting subsections (1) & (2) because it is well-established that the requirements of 
the first two subsections are not as stringent as those of subsection (3). See State v. 
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,430-37 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that subsection (3) 
required more than the "one-man show" that was permissible under subsections (1) & 
(2)); Haraco, Inc. v. American Nat Bank & Trust, 141 F.2d 384,401-402 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(distinguishing similar requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) from those of section 
1962(a)). But see Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 121 S. Ct. 2087,2091 
(2001) (recognizing that previous interpretations of section 1962(c) were too stringent 
and holding that a sole proprietor may be both the person and the enterprise under 
subsection (c)). 
Defendant also cites interpretations of what constitutes an "enterprise," without 
acknowledging that those interpretations have been expressly rejected by Utah courts. 
Compare, e.g., BrAplt. at 31-32 (citing 8th Circuit standard), with State v. McGrath, 749 
P.2d 631, 634-37 (Utah 1988) (implicitly rejecting 8th Circuit standard; Hutchings, 950 
P.2d at 432-33 (expressly rejecting 8th Circuit standard). Similarly, defendant imposes an 
"injury in fact" requirement onto criminal racketeering {BrAplt at 33-34), without 
acknowledging that such a requirement is only statutorily required in civil racketeering. 
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (criminal racketeering), with UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-10-1605 (1999) (providing civil remedy for injuries arising from racketeering) 
{Addendum A). 
Based on defendant's lack of preservation and briefing failures, this Court should 
not consider defendant's appellate arguments raised for the first time on appeal. 
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testimony would have been if witnesses had been called (R. 76-84) (Addendum B). Those 
facts establish that defendant falsely held himself out to be the owner of or associated with 
at least two existing mortgage companies, when in fact he had no association with the 
companies and his appraiser's license had been revoked for prior fraudulent representations 
(R. 76-84) (Addendum B). Defendant sought out homeowners facing foreclosure and falsely 
represented that he could obtain refinancing for them for a fee (id.). Defendant "worked 
with" two other men, Brett Kennedy and William Thomas, who were present during some 
of defendant's encounters with the victims and heard some of his misrepresentations (R. 82). 
Defendant told Thomas to misrepresent himself as an appraiser to one of the victims (id.). 
The facts further establish that defendant traveled throughout the Wasatch Front to solicit his 
victims, including Provo, Tooele, West Jordan, South Jordan, Draper, Murray, and Salt Lake 
City, and also contacted his victims by telephone (R. 76-82). At least once, defendant 
provided a victim with a formal loan application (R. 78). Defendant took the $5000 plus he 
obtained through his pattern of illegal activity and used the proceeds to pay "his personal 
bills" (R. 84). Although the stipulated facts do not otherwise specify how the monies were 
deposited or what "personal" bills were paid, it is reasonable to assume that some of those 
bills covered defendant's vehicle expenses in traveling and telephone expenses in contacting 
the various victims. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, fj 10 & 20,20 P.3d 300 (acknowledging 
that evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution in ruling on a 
motion to quash). 
Based on these limited facts, defendant moved to quash the racketeering charge. But 
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as the trial court properly noted, defendant waived the preliminary hearing (R. 74; R. 156: 6). 
Consequently, defendant could not attack the factual sufficiency of the stipulated facts, but 
only their legal significance. In other words, defendant was only entitled to pretrial dismissal 
of the racketeering charge if, as a matter of law, the use of funds to pay personal bills could 
never satisfy the requirements of sections 76-10-1603(1) or (2). Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10 
(recognizing that in determining probable cause for bindover, all reasonable inferences are 
resolved in favor of the prosecution and resolution of conflicting evidence is left to the fact-
finder at trial). 
The trial court rightfully rejected defendant's legal challenge. The court correctly 
ruled that racketeering requires a "series of crimes" (a pattern of unlawful activity) and "then 
doing something with the gains from the criminal activity" (use or invest) (R.156: 5) 
{Addendum Q. Accord Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 431. That use does not require proof that 
the illegal funds went "somewhere else other than the individual defendant" and does not 
require proof that the use of the proceeds actually furthered the scheme (R. 156: 5 & 7). 
Instead, liability may be predicated on defendant's use of the proceeds for his own benefit 
(R. 156: 7). Accord id. at 433 (holding that for purposes of section 76-10-1603( 1), the person 
and the enterprise may be the "same entity . . . as long as the 'person' is 'actually the direct 
beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity'") (quoting Garbade v. Great Divide 
Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
Moreover, the trial court correctly refused to address the ultimate sufficiency of the 
facts to support a racketeering conviction because, where defendant waived preliminary 
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hearing, the prosecutor was entitled to make her evidentiary showing at trial (R. 156: 6). Cf. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, J 10 (recognizing that "the evidence required to show probable cause is 
relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger as 
the investigation continues" and trial ensues). 
In sum, while more evidence might be required for conviction, alleging that defendant, 
as the principal and the enterprise, used the illegal funds to pay personal bills was sufficient 
to avoid pretrial dismissal of the racketeering charge. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the denial of defendant's motion to reduce and/or quash and, 
thereby, defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ / ^ ) j a y of August, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
CHRISTINE F.SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-6-412, Theft — Classification of offenses — Action 
for treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds 
$5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable 
motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as 
defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of 
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to 
commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree 
felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, 
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, 
mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing 
animal raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen is less than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Sec-
tion 76-6-413, or commits theft of property described in 
Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly liable for three times 
the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
1997 
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76-6-501. Forgery —-Writing* defined. 
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority 
or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentica-
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur-
porta to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency, or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. ises 
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76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punish-
ment as for theft. 
( D A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that 
person with intent to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or 
written statement or representation knowing that the 
statement or representation contains false or fraudulent 
information concerning any fact material to an applica-
tion for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, 
certificate, or contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or 
written statement or representation as part of or in 
support of a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant 
to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in 
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of 
damages for personal or bodily injuries or property dam-
age, knowing that the statement or representation con-
tains false or fraudulent information concerning any fact 
or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived 
from a fraudulent insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a 
scheme or artifice to obtain fees for professional services, 
or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a class B misde-
meanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd), is 
punishable as in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-
1801 for communication fraud for property of like value. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of 
insurance fraud under the same conditions as those set forth 
in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd) shall be measured by the 
total value of all property, money, or other things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act or acts 
described in Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd). ist4 
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-1602. Definitions. 
used in this part: 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietor-
lip, partnership, corporation, business trust, associa-
on, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
idivtduals associated in fact although not a legal entity, 
fid includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity* means engaging in 
mduct which constitutes the commission of at least three 
Disodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
olated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, 
surticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
ise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, 
iken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continu-
ig unlawful conduct and be related either to each other 
' to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes compris-
ig a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred 
\er July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part 
' a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part 
lall have occurred within five years of the commission of 
te next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(3) "Person* includes any individual or entity capable of 
>lding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including 
ate, county, and local governmental entities. 
(4) "Unlawful activity* means to directly engage in 
induct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or 
tentionally aid another person to engage in conduct 
hich would constitute any offense described by the 
iiowing crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or 
nspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of 
iose offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact 
targed or indicted by any authority or is classified as a 
isdemeanor or a felony: 
(a) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 13, Chapter 10, Unauthorized Recording Prac-
tices Act; 
(b) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 19, Environmental Quality Code, Sections 19-1-
101 through 19-7-109; 
(c) taking, destroying, or possessing wildlife or 
parts of wildlife for the primary purpose of sale, 
trade, or other pecuniary gain, in violation of Title 23, 
Chapter 13, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, or 
Section 23-20-4; 
(d) false claims for medical benefits, kickbacks, 
and any other act prohibited by False Claims Act, 
Sections 26-20-1 through 26-20-12; 
(e) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 32A, Chapter 12, Criminal Offenses; 
(f) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales Prac-
tices Act; 
tg) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Con-
trolled Substance Precursor Act; 
(h) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Securities Act; 
(i) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of 
Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code; 
(j) assault or aggravated assault, Sections 76-5-
102 and 76-5-103; 
(k) a threat against life or property, Section 76-5-
107; 
(1) criminal homicide, Sections 76-5-201, 76-5-202, 
and 76-5-203; 
(m) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, Sec-
<n) sexual exploitation of a minor. Section 76-5a-3. 
(o) arson or aggravated arson, Sections 76-6-102 
and 76-6-103; 
(p) causing a catastrophe, Section 76-6-105; 
(q) burglary or aggravated burglary, Sections 76-6-
202 and 76-6-203; 
(r) burglary of a vehicle, Section 76-6-204; 
(s) manufacture or possession of an instrument for 
burglary or theft, Section 76-6-205; 
(t) robbery or aggravated robbery, Sections 76-6-
301 and 76-6-302; 
(u) theft, Section 76-6-404; 
(v) theft by deception, Section 76-6-405; 
(w) theft by extortion. Section 76-6-406; 
(x) receiving stolen property, Section 76-6-408; 
(y) theft of services, Section 76-6-409; 
(z) forgery, Section 76-6-501; 
(aa) fraudulent use of a credit card, Sections 76-6-
506.1, 76-6-506.2, and 76-6-506.4; 
(bb) deceptive business practices, Section 76-6-
507; 
(cc) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the 
business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods, 
Section 76-6-508; 
(dd) bribery of a labor official. Section 76-6-509; 
(ee) defrauding creditors. Section 76-6-511; 
(ff) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial 
institution, Section 76-6*512; 
(gg) unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, 
Section 76-6-513; 
(hh) bribery or threat to influence contest. Section 
76-6-514; 
(ii) making a false credit report, Section 76-6-517; 
(jj) criminal simulation, Section 76-6-518; 
(kk) criminal usury, Section 76-6-520; 
(11) false or fraudulent insurance claim, Section 
76-6-521; 
(mm) computer crimes, Section 76-6-703; 
(nn) sale of a child, Section 76-7-203; 
(oo) bribery to influence official or political actions. 
Section 76-8-103; 
(pp) threats to influence official or political action, 
Section 76-8-104; 
(qq) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, 
Section 76-8-105; 
(rr) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of 
person as public servant, Section 76-8-106; 
(ss) official misconduct, Sections 76-8-201 and 76-
8-202; 
(tt) obstruction of justice, Section 76-8-306; 
(uu) acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent 
criminal prosecution, Section 76-6-308; 
(w) false or inconsistent material statements, Sec-
tion 76-8-502; 
(ww) false or inconsistent statements, Section 76-
8-503; 
(xx) written false statements, Section 76-8-504; 
(yy) tampering with a witness, retaliation against 
a witness or informant, or bribery, Section 76-8-508; 
(zz) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
ceeding, Section 76-8-509; 
(aaa) public assistance fraud in violation of Section 
76-8-1203, 76-8-1204, or 76-8-1205; 
(bbb) intentionally or knowingly causing one ani-
mal to fight with another, Subsection 76-9-30KIMf); 
(ccc) possession, use, or removal of explosives, 
chemical, or incendiary devices or parts, Section 
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add delivery to common earner, mailing, or 
placement on premises of an incendiary device, Sec-
tion 76-10-307, 
(eee) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to 
assault, Section 76-10-507; 
(AT) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, Section 
76-10-521; 
(ggg) alteration of number or mark on pistol or 
revolver, Section 76-10-522; 
(hhh) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade 
name, or trade device, Section 76-10-1002; 
(iii) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, 
trade name, or trade devices, Section 76-10-1003; 
(jij) sales in containers bearing registered trade-
mark of substituted articles, Section 76-10-1004; 
(kkk) selling or dealing with article bearing regis-
tered trademark or service mark with intent to de-
fraud, Section 76-10-1006; 
(111) gambling, Section 76-10-1102; 
(mmm) gambling fraud, Section 76-10-1103; 
(nnn) gambling promotion. Section 76-10-1104; 
(ooo) possessing a gambling device or record, Sec-
tion 76-10-1105; 
(ppp) confidence game, Section 76-10-1109; 
(qqq) distributing pornographic material, Section 
76-10-1204; 
(rrr) inducing acceptance of pornographic mate-
rial, Section 76-10-1205; 
(sss) dealing in harmful material to a minor, Sec-
tion 76-10-1206; 
(ttt) distribution of pornographic films, Section 76-
10-1222; 
(uuu) indecent public displays, Section 76-10-
1228; 
(wv) prostitution, Section 76-10-1302; 
(www) aiding prostitution, Section 76-10-1304; 
(xxx) exploiting prostitution, Section 76-10-1305; 
(yyy) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, Sec-
tion 76-10-1306; 
(Hz) communications fraud. Section 76-10-1801; 
(aaaa) any act prohibited by the criminal provi-
sions of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laun-
dering and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; 
(bbbb) any act prohibited by the criminal provi-
sions of the laws governing taxation in this state; and 
(cccc) any act illegal under the laws of the United 
States and enumerated in Title 18, Section 1961 
(1KB), (C), and (D) of the United States Code. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acta. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any 
proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pat-
tern of unlawful activity in which the person has participated 
as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part 
of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds 
derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the 
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through 
a pattern of unlawful activity. 
<4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). IN? 
76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costa — Forfeiture 
— Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dis-
solution or reorganization — Restraining or-
ders and injunctions — Hearings — Special 
verdict — Findings — Judgment and order of 
forfeiture — Seizure of property — Sale — 
Proceeds — Petitions for remission or mitiga-
tion of forfeiture — Hearing — Disposition. 
(1) A person who violates any provision of Section 76-10-
1603 is guilty of a second degree felony. In addition to 
penalties prescribed by law, the court may order the person 
found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney 
general brought the action, or to the county, if the county 
attorney or district attorney brought the action, the costs of 
investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of 
securing the forfeitures provided for in this section. The 
person shall forfeit to the Uniform School Fund, Title 53A, 
Chapter 16, Section 101, of the Utah Code: 
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of 
any provision of Section 76-10-1603; 
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or prop-
erty or contractual right of any kind affording a source of 
influence over any enterprise which the person has estab-
lished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated m 
the conduct of in violation of Section 76-10-1603; and 
(c) any property constituting or derived from the net 
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly. 
from the conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful 
activity or from any act or conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation 
of any provision of Section 76-10-1603. 
(2) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern 
of unlawful activity consisting of acts or conduct in violation of 
Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. 
the property subject to forfeiture under this section is limited 
to property, the seizure or forfeiture of which would not 
constitute a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected 
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Consti-
tution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the 
exercise of thoee rights. 
(3) In lieu of a line otherwise authorized by law for a 
violation of Section 76-10-1603, a defendant who derives net 
proceeds from a conduct prohibited by Section 76-10-1603. 
may be fined not more than twice the amount of the net 
proceeds. 
(4) Property subject to criminal forfeiture in accord with the 
procedures and substantive protections of the Utah Uniform 
Forfeiture Procedures Act Title 24, Chapter 1, of the Utah 
Code includes: 
(a) real property, including things growing on, affixed 
to, and found in land; and 
(b) tangible and intangible personal property including 
money, rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities 
of any kind; 
(c) but does not include property exchanged or to be 
exchanged for services rendered in connection with the 
defense of the charges or any related criminal case 
(5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of Section 
76-10-1603, and in addition to any penalty prescribed by law 
and in addition to any forfeitures provided for in this section. 
the court may do any or all of the following: 
(a) order the person to divest himself of any interest in 
or any control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise; 
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activi-
ties or investments of any person, including prohiomng 
the person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as 
the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the Utah Cmn.-
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:ut:on and tne Constitution of the United States permit; 
)r 
<a order the dissolution or reorganization of any enter-
prise. 
If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern 
lawful activity consisting of acts or conduct in violation of 
on 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, 
:ourt may not enter any order that would amount to a 
restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights 
r the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
ss or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property 
ribed in Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state treasurer, 
>half of the Uniform School Fund, upon the commission of 
ict or conduct giving rise to the forfeiture under this 
on. 
For purposes of this section, the "net proceeds* of an 
se means property acquired as a result of the violation 
is the direct costs of acquiring the property. 
3-10O4. Enforcement authority of peace officers. 
^withstanding any law to the contrary, peace officers in 
itate of Utah shall have authority to enforce the criminal 
isions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting 
d junes, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and 
iting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the 
kney general or county attorneys' offices. itei 
0* 1006. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of 
unlawful activity — Double damages — Costa, 
including attorney's fee — Arbitration — 
Agency — Burden of proof—Actions by attor-
ney general, county attorney, or district attor-
ney — Dismissal — Statute of limitations — 
Authorised orders of district court. 
) A person injured in his person, business, or property by 
rson engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of 
ion 76-10-1603 may sue in an appropriate district court 
recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of 
ther: 
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury 
suffered as a result of the acts or conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful conduct alleged as part of the cause of 
action; or 
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any 
court of the state or of the United States. 
) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under 
section recovers the cost of the suit, including a reason-
attorney's fee. 
) All actions arising under this section which are 
mded in fraud are subject to arbitration under Title 78, 
pter 31a. 
) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for 
lal damages for harm caused by an agent acting within the 
>e of either his employment or apparent authority. A 
icipal is liable for double damages only if the pattern of 
iwful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of 
on was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, un-
taken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
>ctors or a high managerial agent acting within the scope of 
employment. 
j) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of 
}f is clear and convincing evidence. 
>) The attorney general, county attorney, or, if within a 
secution district, the district attorney may maintain ac-
ts under this section on behalf of the state, the county, or 
person injured by a person engaged in conduct forbidden 
iny provision of Section 76-10-1603, to prevent, restrain, or 
ledy injury as defined in this section and may recover the 
nages and costs allowed by this section. 
17^  In all actions under this section, the elements o( -jcr. 
claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity 
against each defendant. 
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted 
by a private party under this section is dismissed prior to trial 
or disposed of on summary judgment, or if it is determined at 
trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party shall 
recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the 
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the defense against the action, claim, or 
counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall 
be commenced within three years after the conduct prohibited 
by Section 76-10-1603 terminates or the cause of action 
accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any 
limitation to the contrary. 
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the dis-
trict court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy 
injury as defined by this section by issuing appropriate 
orders after making provisions for the rights of innocent 
persons. 
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought 
under this section, the district court may: 
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions; 
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any 
other bond it considers appropriate and necessary in 
connection with any property or any requirement 
imposed upon a party by the court; and 
(iii) enter any other order the court considers nec-
essary and proper. 
(c) After a determination of liability, the district court 
may, in addition to granting the relief allowed in Subsec-
tion (1), do any one or all of the following: 
(i) order any person to divest himself of any inter-
est in or any control, direct or indirect, of any enter-
prise; 
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future 
activities or investments of any person, including 
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same 
type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the 
extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of 
the United States permit; or 
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any 
enterprise. 
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief 
provided by this section, and if the conduct prohibited by 
Section 76-10-1603 has for its pattern of unlawful activity 
acts or conduct illegal under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-
1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter 
any order that would amount to a prior restraint on the 
exercise of an affected party's rights under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or 
Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court shall, 
upon the request of any affected party, and upon the 
notice to all parties, prior to the issuance of any order 
provided for in this subsection, and at any later time, hold 
hearings as necessary to determine whether any materi-
als at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine 
if there is probable cause to believe that any act or 
conduct alleged violates Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. In making its findings the 
court shall be guided by the same considerations required 
of a court making similar findings in criminal cases 
brought under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-
1206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not limited to, the 
definitions in Sections 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-
1216, and the exemptions in Section 76-10-1226. isw 
76-10-1606. Repealed. i»* 
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76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Pen-
alties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the prop-
erty, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the 
scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of 
something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by 
the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (lXe). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary 
element of the offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person 
of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element 
of the offense. 
(5) Each separata communication made for the purpose of 
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud. 
(6) (a) lb communicate as described in Subsection (1) 
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to 
give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not lim-
ited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, tele-
vision, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless 
the pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. IIM 
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AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
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CHARLENE BARLOW, Bar No. 0212 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
5272 South College Drive, Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 284-6343 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
rN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
STIPULATED TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff, FOR PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 
v. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, Case No. 001200833 FS 
Defendant. Judge Michael K. Burton 
For purpose of preliminary hearing only, the parties stipulate and agree that, if 
called to testify at preliminary hearing, the following people would testify as follows: 
JEFF AHLSTROM 
In April 2000, Brooks Bradshaw met with Mr. Ahlstrom at 629 East 2875 North, 
Provo, Utah. Mr. Ahlstrom was attempting to refinance his residence, and Mr. Bradshaw 
represented himself to be a co-owner of Classic Mortgage, and purported to have financial 
interest in numerous other mortgage companies including In-Time Funding. Mr. Bradshaw told 
Mr. Ahlstrom that for a fee, $500 00, he would complete the title search, credit check and other 
f0^) 
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necessary documentation to secure Mr. Ahlstrom's refinancing. Mr. Ahlstrom gave Mr. 
Bradshaw $500.00, and Mr Bradshaw did not complete what he told Mr. Ahlstrom he would. 
DENNY MOORE 
On April 4, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Moore at 9049 South Kenyon 
Circle, West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw introduced himself and told Mr. Moore he was the 
owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he could 
refinance or restructure his present mortgage. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he would have 
to pay Mr. Bradshaw $450 00 for a title search and credit report. Mr. Moore presented Mr. 
Bradshaw $450.00 in cash and requested a receipt. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would prepare a 
receipt and get it to him. Mr. Moore would testify that no receipt has ever been given to him, and 
no credit report or title search has been completed. Mr. Moore attempted to contact Mr. 
Bradshaw, but learned that all the contact numbers Mr. Bradshaw had given him had been 
changed. 
HALBERT GRIBBLE 
On May 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Gribble at 820 East Scott Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself to Mr. Gribble as the owner of Classic 
Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw informed Mr. Gribble that he was aware that Mr 
Gribble was in the middle of a foreclosure process on his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented to 
Mr. Gribble that for a fee of $500.00, Mr. Bradshaw would provide a title search and appraisal on 
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Mr. Gribble's property and assist him with refinancing. Mr. Gribble gave Mr. Bradshaw $500 00, 
and has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since. 
ELIZABETH AND KEITH FITZGERALD 
On March 3, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Brett Kennedy met with Elizabeth and 
Keith Fitzgerald at 9527 South Caledona Circle, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented 
himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could 
refinance the Fitzgeralds' residence in Mr. Bradshaw's name through a Quit Claim Deed, and in 
two years he would deed it back to the Fitzgeralds. Mr. Bradshaw indicated to Elizabeth 
Fitzgerald that he had access to plenty of money and that he could also purchase their store Mr. 
Bradshaw stated that if he decided not to purchase the store, he knew other individuals who 
would be interested. Mr. Bradshaw presented Mrs Fitzgerald with a loan application and stated 
he would require $450.00 to pay for the credit check and appraisal. Mrs. Fitzgerald informed Mr. 
Bradshaw that she had the residence appraised in November 1999, but the appraisal was not high 
enough to refinance. Mr. Bradshaw told Mrs. Fitzgerald that that would not be a problem, he 
would get an appraisal high enough. Mrs. Fitzgerald gave Mr. Bradshaw $450.00, and Mr. 
Bradshaw has not contacted or delivered anything he represented he would accomplish. 
RICHARD BRIMLEY 
On April 15, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Richard Brimley at 5168 South 
Cottonwood Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the co-owner of 
Classic Mortgage and stated that he had brokered loans with several mortgage companies. Mr 
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Brimley would testify that he informed Mr Bradshaw in detail about the real estate project he was 
attempting to complete and the financing he would require. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr Brimley that 
for $500.00 he would complete an appraisal, title search and credit check. Mr. Brimley gave Mr. 
Bradshaw a check for $500.00, made out to Mr. Bradshaw, because Mr. Bradshaw stated that he 
wasn't sure which appraiser he would use. Mr. Brimley would testify that after Mr. Bradshaw 
took the check and cashed it, Mr. Bradshaw has not made contact with him; Mr. Brimley also has 
been unable to contact Mr. Bradshaw. 
MAURICE AND LOUISE OHUMUKINI 
On April 17, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Maurice and Louise Ohumukini, at 
1160 East 800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of 
Classic Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mrs. Ohumukini would testify that Mr. Bradshaw told 
her that with his financial contacts and resources he would assist her in refinancing some property 
she and her husband owned. Mr. Bradshaw told her that for $500.00 he would arrange for an 
appraisal on the property, and complete the necessary title search and credit check for refinancing. 
Mrs. Ohumukini gave Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00 for the stated work to be performed. 
Mrs. Ohumukini has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since April, and none of the represented work 
has been completed. 
KAREN BUSH 
On June 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Karen Bush by telephone. Karen 
Bush's residence at 613 Blueridge Drive, Tooele, Utah was in foreclosure. Mr. Bradshaw 
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indicated to Karen that he was interested in refinancing the residence in order to help her. On 
June 11, 2000 Mr Bradshaw met with Karen Bush and her husband, at 613 Blueridge Drive, 
Tooele, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Karen that he uses his own money to refinance and that a title 
search and appraisal would be necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw stated the 
cost was $600.00, which would include $400.00 for the appraisal; $100.00 for the title search, 
and his fee of $100 00. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would accomplish the transaction by June 
29, 2000, the date of the foreclosure in the Tooele County Court. Karen Bush never heard from 
Mr Bradshaw, and she contacted the Tooele City Police Department. Detective Shawn Gleed 
contacted Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Bradshaw told Detective Gleed he would refund the $600.00. 
Karen Bush has not had contact with Mr. Bradshaw, and no refund has been made. 
MIKE AND HOLLY CURTIS 
In June 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Mike and Holly Curtis at 6587 South 
Alfred Way, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. and Mrs. Curtis that he owned a mortgage 
company, and used a title company to facilitate all his refinancing transactions. Mr. Bradshaw 
gave the Curtises a loan application form, indicating that it would grant him permission to 
perform a credit check and title search necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw told 
Mr and Mrs. Curtis that the cost would be $500.00. Holly Curtis would testify that they gave 
Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00, hesitantly. After they had not heard from Mr. Bradshaw they 
attempted to contact him, with no success. Mrs. Curtis and her husband, in approximately August 
2000, saw Mr. Bradshaw at a local gas station and requested their money back. Mr. Bradshaw 
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told them he would get it to them within the next couple of days. Mrs. Curtis would testify that 
they have received no contact from Mr. Bradshaw. 
CLIFF HARRIS 
On 13, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Cliff Harris at 12109 South Samson Circle, 
Draper, Utah. Mr. Harris was having some financial difficulties and was in the process of 
refinancing his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage 
and stated that for $500.00 he would arrange an appraisal, credit check and title search to 
facilitate the refinance. Mr. Bradshaw indicated that there would be no problem in getting an 
appraisal high enough to sufficiently cover the refinancing. Mr. Harris gave Mr. Bradshaw 
$500 00 to perform the agreed work. Mr. Harris has had no contact with Mr. Bradshaw since 
giving him the money. 
HOLLY ANDERSON 
On April 7, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Holly Anderson at 5997 South 200 
East, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage, in St. 
George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated to Holly Anderson that he had the capabilities and contacts 
to assist her with refinancing her residence. Mr. Bradshaw told Holly Anderson that for $400.00 
he would complete a credit check and title search necessary to secure her refinancing. Holly 
Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $400.00 for the agreed work to be accomplished and has received 
nothing since the transaction. 
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MARLON ANDERSON 
On April 14, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Marlon Anderson at 9838 South 
TeeBox Drive, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of a 
mortgage company. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could assist Mr. Anderson with refinancing his 
property for a fee of $500.00. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Anderson that for the $500.00 he would 
arrange an appraisal, perform a credit check and complete a title search, all necessary to arrange 
the refinancing. Mr. Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $500 00 to complete the agreed work. Mr. 
Anderson has never received any of the promised work and has been unable to contact Mr. 
Bradshaw. 
BRETT KENNEDY 
Mr. Kennedy would testify that he used to work with the Mr. Bradshaw and he 
witnessed some of the statements and promises made by Mr. Bradshaw to the individuals listed 
above. 
WILLIAM (BILL) THOMAS 
Mr. Thomas would testify that he used to work with Mr. Bradshaw and that he 
witnessed some of the statements and promises listed above. Mr. Thomas would also testify that 
Mr Bradshaw told him to falsely represent himself as an appraiser to JefF Ahlstrom. 
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JOHN HEMPHILL 
Mr. Hemphill would testify that he is the owner of In-Time Funding. Mr. Hemphill 
knew Mr. Bradshaw but the representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the 
defendant was a part owner of In-Time Funding were false. 
TERRISON SPINKS 
Mr. Spinks is the owner of Classic Mortgage. He knew the Mr Bradshaw but the 
representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the Mr. Bradshaw was a part owner of 
Classic Mortgage were not true. 
JON BROWN 
Mr. Brown, Lead Investigator for the Division of Real Estate, Department of 
Commerce, would testify that Mr. Bradshaw had received a NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT before the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board in 1998 The 
defendant Brooks Bradshaw had a pattern of inflating property values for the purpose of 
defrauding by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Defendant Brooks Bradshaw had his 
license to act as a state registered appraiser revoked in 1998. 
JEFF WRIGHT 
Mr. Wright would testify that he is an investigator with the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. Mr. Wright interviewed Mr. Bradshaw at which time Mr. Bradshaw admitted 
that he had met with the individuals listed above and in the affidavit of probable cause filed with 
this case and received money from them in return for the promises that he made to help them 
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refinance their properties. Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he used the money 
to pay his personal bills. Mr. Bradshaw provided Investigator Wright with a list of individuals 
from whom he had taken money. Investigator Wright compared and confirmed the list with 
information obtained in the course of the investigation and it proved to be accurate. 
DATED this ^ ~ day of May, 2001. 
Robert K. Heineman 
Attorney for defendant 
Charlene Barlow 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Case No. 001200833FS 
HEARING RE. MOTION TO 
QUASH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of July, 
2001, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., sitting as 
Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of this 
cause, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
JL24 JEftjt 500 South, Suite 300 
N u E f e J e Citypffaftf^ 84111 
Utah Court of Appeals Utah cJJt 5 % t * 
MAR 18 2002 N4PO72002 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Pauiette 
dark of the 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
365 BRAHMA DRIVE (80D 26*0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 64107 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
(Off t h e r e c o r d . ) 
THE COURT: And Mr. Heineman with the defendant are 
present. 
The matter was set on this calendar for the purpose 
of scheduling and the decision that I would make in relation 
to the defendant's motion, which was a motion to quash the 
bind over and reduce the degree of the offenses charged and 
also to—and that was in relation to the counts of 
communication fraud and also to quash the count of 
racketeering• 
And then I suppose in relation to my—well, and then 
to schedule the matter because regardless of my determination 
here, there would still be a matter that would need a setting-
-well, I suppose if I quashed, that would send back the matter 
to be—for a preliminary hearing and so it's a matter of 
scheduling either a trial or sending it back for a further 
preliminary hearing and—and setting that preliminary hearing. 
So, that's the scheduling, I think, that's anticipated, one of 
those two. 
And I've considered at some length here, the—the 
motion that's made and I've heard argument on the matter and— 
and also in connection with the matter, there had been a 
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waiver of the preliminary hearing for the set of facts 
entitled Stipulated Testimony for Preliminary Hearing that had 
been submitted as a factual basis in terms of my consideration 
of the motions that I've just indicated. 
The first motion is to quash the bind over in 
connection with the counts of communication fraud. I won't—I 
won't rehash, if you will, the arguments and the various 
considerations. It seems to me that the argument basically 
hinged on how one would interpret the word "another" as to 
whether that was plural or singular and whether the term 
"scheme" as used in the statute, was restricted in some way 
to—to each victim. 
That seemed to be the thrust of the argument, so 
consequently aggregating various—the—-the amounts obtained or 
sough to be obtained from various victims would not be the 
statutory scheme, if you will, a scheme within a scheme, the 
statutory approach to communications fraud. 
But it appears to me that the word "another" can and 
is—can and is defined in the plural and basically, I come to 
that conclusion because the statute is very specific in 
aggregation of damages; in other words, the statute seems to 
add to the definition that draws the conclusion for me that 
"another", the term "another" can be plural. 
The term "scheme" however, is singular but it's not 
singular in terms of victims; in other words, it's not one 
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victim, one scheme. I think the statutory approach here is 
that we aggregate within the scheme to determine the degree of 
the offense of each communication. The way the State has 
charged this is, rather than a—one communication, one count, 
they have one victim, one count, although the allegation is 
that one has communicated with this victim. 
So, the way they've chosen to do this, although I 
can see the possibility of taking each communication with one 
victim and breaking that out to one count, I don't see that 
this is a question of double jeopardy, because what the 
statute seeks to punish is different communications, is 
individual communications. So, that's the conduct and of 
course, this presumes—I've taken the facts as being able to 
be proved by the State. 
They do have to show, the State does have to show 
that there is a scheme here, but that's not necessarily under 
the statute restricted to one victim. I—that's my conclusion 
on that. 
I don't think this is a Shondell situation because 
as I say, this is—this is not a theft and a theft. The 
Shondell situation would be—or the Shondell rule, I should 
say, would be, if I have one set of conduct that's punishable 
under two statutes, then I'd pick the statute that has the 
least penalty, has the lesser penalty. 
But the conduct that's being punished here is not 
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the theft, it is the communication in a scheme to defraud. 
That's a different—that's not a theft, that's communication 
fraud and not a Shondell situation. 
In terms of the racketeering, that—that's—the 
argument there seemed to hinge on, seemed to focus—well, on 
whether an individual is the one one invests in and so forth. 
The statute permits that. What racketeering seems to be under 
the statute is that I engage in a certain defined category of 
conduct, which is a series of offenses. And then, that 
qualifies then for the racketeering, but then I must do 
something with the—the gains from that criminal activity. 
And the argument, the defense argument seems to me 
that there's, quite frankly, no showing, I suppose, what—as 
to what happened to this—the ill-gotten gains; but that's a 
matter of proof that we don't have as yet. 
So, the only issue that I'm called upon at this 
point, I suppose, to determine is to whether the State must 
show that your investment or your—where these—where these 
illegally obtained proceeds went was somewhere else other than 
the individual defendant. And it appears to me that the 
statute does anticipate that if you use for yourself the—the-
-the gains, then you are in violation of the racketeering if 
the predicate is also proven, that is a series of criminal 
activity. 
What I don't have in the stipulated facts is where 
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these ill-gotten gains—how they were used. But that is not 
to say, because there was a waiver of the preliminary hearing, 
that the State is not to be given an opportunity to make that 
necessary showing* 
Now, I don't know what was anticipated under that 
kind of a circumstance. I guess what I'm indicating to you is 
this: You've waived the preliminary hearing, reserving these 
arguments and giving me a set of facts upon which to determine 
these arguments, but I find the stipulated testimony 
inadequate on this one issue, in terms of the use of the ill-
gotten gains. 
Now, I don't know what was anticipated. Whether a 
preliminary hearing to focus in on those non-existent facts or 
if there was non-existent facts, that because there was a 
waiver, waived the preliminary hearing. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I think what we were contemplating 
was— 
THE COURT: Am I—am I—have I confused—have I 
confused the situation? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Well, perhaps we confused it by 
calling it a waiver because perhaps more of what it was was a 
bind over upon stipulated facts rather than a—a waiver in the 
typical sense of a waiver. We're not doing anything at all 
here at this particular hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, I can—yeah, and as I say, I 
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understand the argument, but it seems to hinge on how—how— 
how were the gains used and indeed, there has to be a showing, 
although it may be that he used the gains himself, which I 
would determine to be sufficient under the statute, but 
there's nothing in the facts, I suppose other than the 
implication, I don't—as I went through the facts, I didn't— 
there was no fact presented to me regarding how the proceeds 
were to be used or were used. 
MR. HEINEMAN: And I guess my argument on that point 
was a little more specific. It's my contention that in order 
to meet the elements of that statute, they have to show it was 
invested somehow towards furthering the scheme; so him using 
the proceeds for himself, to buy himself some Star Bucks 
Coffee or take himself to the movie or put gas in his car for 
whatever purpose, wouldn't meet that. If he uses the proceeds 
to print out business cards to help further his communication 
fraud scheme, arguably, that would. 
And that's how I was seeing that particular 
distinction and I don't believe the State has any evidence 
that these were used for anything other than him and his just 
normal living expenses. 
THE COURT: Well, and that's what I'm—I'm finding, 
that I respectfully disagree; that using the proceeds for 
himself, if you will, or not towards furthering the scheme 
does qualify under that element in the racketeering. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
What I didn't have in the facts and I apologize if I 
just misread them, but there was nothing that indicated one 
way or the other how it was used. There is an element that 
must show that the proceeds were used, consequently, I suppose 
if you had a circumstance where I got some money from somebody 
and didn't use it at all, I held it, that that may be— 
although I'm not going to decide that today, but that may well 
be a circumstance in which one of the essential elements of 
racketeering has not been met, but because the facts didn't 
take it that one more step as to how the—how it was used at 
all, then I didn't know whether—well, like I say, that's my 
determination. But whether you anticipated a need here, other 
than through trial but at preliminary hearing to get into that 
other element, that is how the proceeds were used, I—I didn't 
know that. That's why I leave that question open. 
MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, I did want to point out on 
Page 9, Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he 
used the money to pay his personal bills. That's the only 
thing that we put into the stipulated facts. It's— 
THE COURT: Well, maybe I didn't see that then. 
MS. BARLOW: Well, and it is just one sentence. I 
can see how the Court might— 
THE COURT: Right at the end. 
MS. BARLOW: Yeah. Right. 
THE COURT: Well, that may be suffi~I don't— 
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MS. BARLOW: I don't know that it matters, you know. 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't. That's exactly the 
sort of thing, I suppose, that I was looking for in terms of 
how they were used, because the argument is, How are they 
used? And if that statement—and I didn't—I didn't pick up 
on that last sentence, I suppose. If that statement is a—a 
statement intended to go to the proceeds, then I suppose that 
answers my question and there's nothing further, but I—I 
mean, in terms of further testimony by way of a preliminary 
hearing to—to determine that issue. 
Mr. Heineman, your comment on that? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Well, that is in the stipulation and 
that's what all of us anticipated. And frankly, even if it 
weren't in there, there's probably a reasonable inference just 
from the fact that he received these monies. Most people will 
use money rather than stuff it in a mattress; but— 
THE COURT: Well, as I say, I don't—that's 
certainly an essential element that the State is going to have 
to prove and— 
MR. HEINEMAN: But the legal issue as— 
THE COURT: But to—but to the legal issue as to 
whether the proceeds must be used to further the scheme, as I 
say, I respectfully disagree. 
Consequently, your motion is denied and—and as I 
say, I think that leaves us then with setting this matter for 
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trial. 
MR. HEINEMAN: We'll probably have a—a disposition 
with a conditional guilty plea is what I'm contemplating. 
THE COURT: Would you like to set this maybe for 
some scheduling date or— 
MR. HEINEMAN: Why don't we pick a disposition date 
and if— 
THE COURT: Disposition. 
MR. HEINEMAN: —further proceedings are needed 
after that, we can schedule them at that time. 
THE COURT: If that's agreeable, then let's set it 
for—I would put it on a law and motion calendar. July 31st, 
August 14th. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I'm going to be out of town both 
those dates. If we could do the 28th? 
THE COURT: 28th of August at 9:00 o'clock. 
Ms. Barlow? 
MS. BARLOW: That's fine, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's show then that date as a 
disposition date and Mr. Bradshaw, we'd have a written notice 
for you of that hearing. 
Is there anything further to consider on this 
matter? 
MS. BARLOW: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant ' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO QUASH 
BINDOVER AND REDUCE THE DEGREE 
Plaintiff, : OF OFFENSE OF CHARGED COUNTS 
v. : 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, : Case No. 001200833FS 
Honorable JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Defendant. 
Defendant BROOKS BRADSHAW, by and through counsel, 
respectfully moves that this court quash bindover for racketeering 
and reduce the degree of offense of the charged communications 
fraud counts. 
FACTS 
The parties have filed a STIPULATED TESTIMONY FOR 
PRELIMINARY HEARING which outlines the factual basis for the 
State's charges. In summary, Mr. Brooks is accused of defrauding 
eleven persons of amounts ranging from $400 to $600 each, for a 
total of $5,400. He is charged and has been bound over on eleven 
counts of communications fraud, second degree felonies, and a 
twelfth count of racketeering, a second degree felony. 
For reasons set forth in this memorandum, Mr. Brooks 
contends that he should be charged with eleven separate counts of 
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class A misdemeanor communications fraud or theft by deception, and 
the racketeering count should be quashed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD COUNTS 
I. STATUTORY SCHEME 
Communications fraud is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801: 
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud--Elements--Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another 
money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of 
the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of 
the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the 
obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense 
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value 
of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to 
be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (1)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a 
necessary element of the offense described in Subsection 
(1) .. 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any 
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently 
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deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value 
is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose 
of executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described 
in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) 
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to 
give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not 
limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, 
television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section 
unless the pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. 
Emphasis added. 
Subsection (2) provides that all amounts in a scheme are 
aggregated to determine the level of offense. Subsection (5) 
provides that each communication is a separate offense. The 
interplay of these two subsections violates statutory and 
constitutional prohibitions, and this court should quash or reduce 
the degree of the charged offenses accordingly. 
II. AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THE 
STATE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO AGGREGATE 
AMOUNTS ACROSS DIFFERENT SCHEMES AND DIFFERENT 
VICTIMS. 
Subsection (2) of the communications fraud statute 
defines the degree of offense by the total amount obtained "by the 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)." Subsection (1) 
speaks of a scheme or artifice to defraud another. Subsection (1) 
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does not speak of a scheme or artifice to defraud others, nor does 
it speak at all of larger schemes involving more than one victim. 
Mr. Bradshaw is alleged to have had eleven separate 
schemes with eleven different victims. Here, the State is using 
the amount obtained in all eleven schemes to enhance the charge in 
each scheme. This it may not do. If Mr. Bradshaw had obtained 
different amounts on different occasions within a single scheme 
with a single victim, those amounts could be aggregated to define 
a higher level of offense; but nothing in the statute purports to 
allow aggregation across different schemes. Reading the statute as 
a whole, State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992) ("statutory 
provisions should be construed to give full effect to all their 
terms"), the offenses alleged here should have been charged as 
eleven separate counts of class A misdemeanor communications fraud. 
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS INTERPRETED 
AND USED BY THE STATE, RUNS AFOUL OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-1-402 (1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides in pertinent part 
that "when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision." As Mr. Brooks is 
currently charged, this statute has been violated. Each act is 
punished no fewer than eleven times. The act of defrauding victim 
1 is punished in count I as a second degree felony, and is punished 
again in each of counts II through XI to enhance the penalties for 
." < 
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those communications from a class A misdemeanor level to the second 
degree felony level. Each individual act, by itself, could only be 
charged as a class A misdemeanor. 
IV. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS APPLIED HERE 
BY THE STATE, VIOLATES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PROTECTIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The double jeopardy clause provides three protections: 
It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal/-1 It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.11 And 
it protects against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.[] 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 
23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnote cites omitted). 
Here, each offense of communications fraud is being 
punished no less than eleven times, as each is used to increase the 
degree of offense for the other ten counts. This case is thus 
distinguishable from the federal sentencing guideline context. In 
Witte v. United States. 515 U.S. 389, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 
3 51 (1995), the Supreme Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge 
to prosecution for an offense which had already been considered as 
relevant conduct in a prior sentencing. The Court carefully noted 
that the relevant conduct was only used to fix the amount of time 
that would be served within the authorized statutory range of 5 to 
4 0 years. Thus, the punishment imposed was solely for the 
underlying offense, rather than for the relevant conduct. The 
Court also noted additional safeguards in the sentencing guidelines 
to allow a downward departure to "protect petitioner against having 
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the length of his sentence multiplied by duplicative consideration 
of the same criminal conduct." Id. at 405. 
Here, each act by itself is only punishable as a class A 
misdemeanor. The additional acts are not used solely to fix the 
amount of time within the 0-365 day range authorized for class A 
misdemeanors, but are instead used to impose additional punishment 
by elevating the offense to the second degree level, and imposing 
up to fifteen times the amount of incarceration in the form of an 
indeterminate sentence of 1-15 years in prison. Unlike the federal 
guidelines, no downward departure is possible to compensate for the 
duplicitous charges here. The double jeopardy clauses of the State 
and Federal constitutions are violated here. 
V. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS APPLIED HERE BY 
THE STATE, VIOLATES THE SHONDEL DOCTRINE AND THE 
RULE OF LENITY. 
In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the court 
held that where two separate statutes penalize the same conduct in 
different ways, .the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty. 
Here, the actions of Mr. Bradshaw could be prosecuted under the 
communications fraud statute, or as theft by deception. There is 
no question but that, if charged as eleven counts of theft by 
deception, each offense would be a class A misdemeanor. "When 
several articles are stolen by the defendant from different owners 
on different occasions, multiple larcenies are committed. It 
matters not that the takings occur on the same expedition, and are 
committed in rapid succession or in pursuance of a larcenous scheme 
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or plan." Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton's Criminal Law §347 p. 372 
(15'h Ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted) . Accord State v. Gibson, 108 P. 
349, 350 (Utah 1910) ("This case is not like that argued to us by 
appellant where the successive larcenies, each complete and 
distinct, did not constitute one continuous transaction: or where 
properties belonging to different persons located at different 
places were purloined, and where each asportation constituted a 
separate and distinct offense."). 
The theft by deception statute clearly proscribes oral 
communications used to obtain property by deception. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) defines deception as occurring when a person 
intentionally "[c]reates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false . . ." Nothing more 
occurred here. The elements are the same, and Mr. Bradshaw is 
entitled to the lesser penalty. 
The rule of lenity compels the same result. "It is well 
established that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved 
in favor of lenity ..." State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 564 n.3 
(Utah 1987) . Any ambiguity in how the communications fraud statute 
should be construed should be resolved in favor of lenity. Mr. 
Bradshaw should be charged with eleven class A misdemeanors. 
B. RACKETEERING COUNT 
I. STATUTORY SCHEME 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1) defines an enterprise as 
"any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
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business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union 
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) defines pattern of 
unlawful activity as three episodes of unlawful activity with the 
same or similar purposes or methods of commission. 
The individual offenses that can constitute unlawful 
activity are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4), and 
include theft, theft by deception, forgery, prostitution, and a 
host of other offenses. 
Acts prohibited by the statute are set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1603: 
§ 76-10-1603. Unlawful acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received 
any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, 
from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person 
has participated as a principal, to use or invest, 
directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the 
proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the 
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, 
any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern 
of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or 
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or 
associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
II. THE RACKETEERING COUNT SHOULD BE QUASHED, AS THERE 
IS NO CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE HERE. 
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The racketeering statute prohibits numerous acts, but 
none of the prohibited acts have been committed by Mr. Bradshaw 
here. Subsection (1) prohibits investment of proceeds in an 
enterprise or in operation of an enterprise. Here, there is no 
enterprise. The only argument the State can make is that an 
enterprise can be a natural person, and Mr. Bradshaw is the 
enterprise. However, it is impossible to invest money in a person, 
or to use money to operate a person. Slavery is illegal. U.S. 
Const, amend. XIII. Mr. Bradshaw cannot invest proceeds in 
himself, as he cannot be bought or sold. He cannot invest proceeds 
to "operate" himself; it takes no money for a person to "operate," 
whatever that may mean. 
Finally, the schemes allegedly employed here do not 
require any capital. They consist solely of Mr. Bradshaw making 
false representations to the alleged victims, and obtaining money 
from them as a result. No proceeds were invested in any 
enterprise. 
Subsection (2) similarly prohibits acquisition of an 
interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of 
unlawful activity. Mr. Bradshaw did not and cannot gain a greater 
interest in his person. He is a free citizen of the United States. 
Subsection (3) is not applicable. Mr. Bradshaw is not 
employed by any enterprise, and is not associated with any 
enterprise. Finally, there is no conspiracy here, and subsection 
(4) is inapplicable. 
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The State's theory seems to be that Mr. Bradshaw is the 
enterprise, and invested proceeds in himself. While he may have 
used the proceeds for his own benefit, none were invested in any 
criminal enterprise. The State's interpretation of this statute is 
arbitrary and capricious in violation of due process as guaranteed 
by U.S. Const, amend. V and XIV and article I, § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. By the State's reasoning, any prostitute who turns 
three tricks is a racketeer. A forger who passes three checks is 
a racketeer. Likewise, a child who shoplifts bubblegum on three 
occasions is a racketeer. This cannot be what was intended. This 
Court should quash the bindover of the racketeering count. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Bradshaw respectfully 
requests that the Co^rt quash his bindover on Count XII, 
Racketeering, and that Counts I -through XI each be reduced to 
reflect allegations c : class A misdemeanor communications fraud or 
class A misdemeanor cheft by deception. J 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ) day of May, 2001. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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